THE "HISTORICAL" VERSION OF MEDICINE AT WAR (2)
Regarding the inclusion of the Monsanto submission in the Final Report,
Professor F B. Smith states, in support of the Royal Commission, that the
Commissioner "was within legal convention in not acknowledging it; but
politically he made a mistake in failing to do so." He continues: "the Monsanto
submission was, indeed, extensively incorporated into the text because it was the
most authoritative and lucid survey of the toxicological [effects], birth defects and
cancer allegations pinned on Agent Orange" (2). Smith does not substantiate this
assessment of the submission's scientific correctness. He also claims (2, p. 363)
that "the judge's accusers . . . nowhere suggest, let alone demonstrate, that the
Monsanto report contains errors"; in fact, the relevant criticism is readily
available (35-38). For a professor of history, the latter claim is all the more
remarkable given that in response to our criticism (35), the Department of
Veterans' Affairs had admitted that the Commission's report contained several
serious errors (4).
Professor Smith quotes Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Repetition does not transform a
lie into a truth." This is certainly a wise rule, and the professor should have stuck
to it himself. Instead-and in spite of our rebuttals (35), other publications
(36-38), and the Department of Veterans' Affairs statement (4)-Smith reiterates
the misinterpretations and manipulations of our published data by the Royal
Commission. As an example, it is clear in his chapter dealing with our studies (2,
p. 291) that he has not read them, because quite different studies are confused
and are not correctly cited. And later (2, p. 329) he obviously confuses Axelson
with Hardell, in addition to making erroneous statements.
Smith claims that Hardell's subjects were drawn "from selective lists of
pensioners supplied by the trade union which had unilaterally extended their
alleged periods of exposure." This is a complete misunderstanding. All cancer
cases were obtained from Cancer Registers, and all controls from National
Population Register or causes of Death Registers, as described in our
publications.
It is hard to comprehend what Smith means by "[Hardell's] subjects and control
groups were never held constant, and were muddled throughout." This statement
is in total disagreement with the evaluation by the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences ("the clearly described and sound methods employed") (5).
Some other falsehoods:
a. "The investigation had no control for exposure to styrene and benzene, which
were known risk factors in malignant lymphoma, and no control for past tobacco
smoking." On the contrary, exposure to organic solvents such as styrene and
benzene were very well covered in this study (8), and tobacco smoking was
assessed thoroughly and found not to be a risk factor.
b. "Two of Hardell's seven cases of soft tissue sarcoma were subsequently
reclassified by a Swedish colleague as other cancers." On the contrary, all such
cases were scrutinized by a pathologist specialized in soft-tissue sarcoma and
were verified before the study was done. No reclassification of these seven
cases was made by a Swedish or any other doctor.
c. "One of [Hardell's] soft tissue sarcoma cases had ceased his spraying work
before 1950." No such exposure history exists.
d. "Yet he [Hardell] could not tell . . . which of his subjects had been specially
exposed to phenoxy acids." In fact, our publications give detailed information on
such exposure on an individual basis. .
There are many more examples of false statements in Medicine at War, which
claims to give the true story of the medical aspects of the use of Agent Orange in
Vietnam. We are mystified why a book of this kind has been written. Equally
remarkable is Smith's statement that Axelson never claimed there were any
errors in the Commission's report (2, p. 363), despite the formal protest sent to
the Governor General of Australia (35) and the admission of errors by the
Department of Veterans' Affairs (4). This book is not a historical document but
an uncritical defense of a controversial Royal Commission report. Instead, a
thorough and objective search for different original sources should have been
made, and the questionable role of this Royal Commission would have been well
worth documenting for the future.
Through the centuries, many seem to have had a need for mythographers in the
aftermath of wars. We had hoped this phenomenon belonged to the past.
Regarding the inclusion of the Monsanto submission in the Final Report,
Professor F B. Smith states, in support of the Royal Commission, that the
Commissioner "was within legal convention in not acknowledging it; but
politically he made a mistake in failing to do so." He continues: "the Monsanto
submission was, indeed, extensively incorporated into the text because it was the
most authoritative and lucid survey of the toxicological [effects], birth defects and
cancer allegations pinned on Agent Orange" (2). Smith does not substantiate this
assessment of the submission's scientific correctness. He also claims (2, p. 363)
that "the judge's accusers . . . nowhere suggest, let alone demonstrate, that the
Monsanto report contains errors"; in fact, the relevant criticism is readily
available (35-38). For a professor of history, the latter claim is all the more
remarkable given that in response to our criticism (35), the Department of
Veterans' Affairs had admitted that the Commission's report contained several
serious errors (4).
Professor Smith quotes Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Repetition does not transform a
lie into a truth." This is certainly a wise rule, and the professor should have stuck
to it himself. Instead-and in spite of our rebuttals (35), other publications
(36-38), and the Department of Veterans' Affairs statement (4)-Smith reiterates
the misinterpretations and manipulations of our published data by the Royal
Commission. As an example, it is clear in his chapter dealing with our studies (2,
p. 291) that he has not read them, because quite different studies are confused
and are not correctly cited. And later (2, p. 329) he obviously confuses Axelson
with Hardell, in addition to making erroneous statements.
Smith claims that Hardell's subjects were drawn "from selective lists of
pensioners supplied by the trade union which had unilaterally extended their
alleged periods of exposure." This is a complete misunderstanding. All cancer
cases were obtained from Cancer Registers, and all controls from National
Population Register or causes of Death Registers, as described in our
publications.
It is hard to comprehend what Smith means by "[Hardell's] subjects and control
groups were never held constant, and were muddled throughout." This statement
is in total disagreement with the evaluation by the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences ("the clearly described and sound methods employed") (5).
Some other falsehoods:
a. "The investigation had no control for exposure to styrene and benzene, which
were known risk factors in malignant lymphoma, and no control for past tobacco
smoking." On the contrary, exposure to organic solvents such as styrene and
benzene were very well covered in this study (8), and tobacco smoking was
assessed thoroughly and found not to be a risk factor.
b. "Two of Hardell's seven cases of soft tissue sarcoma were subsequently
reclassified by a Swedish colleague as other cancers." On the contrary, all such
cases were scrutinized by a pathologist specialized in soft-tissue sarcoma and
were verified before the study was done. No reclassification of these seven
cases was made by a Swedish or any other doctor.
c. "One of [Hardell's] soft tissue sarcoma cases had ceased his spraying work
before 1950." No such exposure history exists.
d. "Yet he [Hardell] could not tell . . . which of his subjects had been specially
exposed to phenoxy acids." In fact, our publications give detailed information on
such exposure on an individual basis. .
There are many more examples of false statements in Medicine at War, which
claims to give the true story of the medical aspects of the use of Agent Orange in
Vietnam. We are mystified why a book of this kind has been written. Equally
remarkable is Smith's statement that Axelson never claimed there were any
errors in the Commission's report (2, p. 363), despite the formal protest sent to
the Governor General of Australia (35) and the admission of errors by the
Department of Veterans' Affairs (4). This book is not a historical document but
an uncritical defense of a controversial Royal Commission report. Instead, a
thorough and objective search for different original sources should have been
made, and the questionable role of this Royal Commission would have been well
worth documenting for the future.
Through the centuries, many seem to have had a need for mythographers in the
aftermath of wars. We had hoped this phenomenon belonged to the past.